The lack of fit between the periods to which generations of human rights are often assigned and their comparatively youthful existence in positive international law do not foreclose the possibility of a chronological account of their international legal status.
Human rights in international law are often portrayed by international legal scholars as possessing a unique chronology of their own, one that commences in the aftermath of the Second World War and which continues through the latter half of the 20th century to the present day. 13 Vasak alluded to such a conception when he characterised the international of the 20th century, social and economic rights are first-generation rights, and civil and political rights are their relatively youthful second-generational relatives.
17
In fact, from this perspective, the emergence of what we understand to be thirdgeneration rights occurred before civil and political rights received formal expression in international law. With the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia guaranteeing religious freedom for minority communities, minority rights received international recognition at the very moment that international law began to conceive of states as sovereign legal actors.
While it recognised the sovereign right of princes to determine the religion of their own states, the Treaty of Westphalia also guaranteed the right of Lutherans and Calvinists in specified regions to vested in members of minority communities the right to practise their faith in public and private realms.
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Minority rights also rose to international legal prominence after World War I with the adoption of a host of multilateral and bilateral treaties, monitored by the League of Nations, which provided protection to populations adversely affected by the war and the subsequent redrawing of territorial boundaries in Europe. Although minority rights were 17 Ibid 17 (the Universal Declaration's 'great contribution is that it extended the human rights platform to embrace the whole field-civil, political, economic, social and cultural, and made the different rights interrelated and mutually reinforcing'). 18 Article 28 of the Treaty, for example, stipulated that "those of the Confession of Augsburg, and particularly the Inhabitants of Oppenheim, shall be put in possession again of their Churches, and Ecclesiastical Estates, as they were in the Year 1624. as also that all others of the said Confession of Augsburg, who shall demand it, shall have the free Exercise of their Religion, as well in publick Churches at the appointed Hours, as in private in their own Houses, or in others chosen for this purpose by Justice-one year before the coming into force of the two Covenants. 24 If we are to ascribe a chronology to these events, it is a much more complex one than what is offered by generational accounts of human rights. Given that all rights-regardless of which generation they are said to belong to-give rise to positive and negative state obligations, the key task is not to determine whether a right is positive or negative. It is instead to identify, in specific contexts, the particular configuration of state obligations-positive and negative-to which a human right gives rise. This configuration is itself dependent on the nature of the interests that the right is deemed to protect, and the extent to which it contains positive obligations will depend, in part, on how much value those specifying its terms place on state intervention or market ordering.
GENERATIONS AS ANALYTICAL CATEGORIES
Vasak himself alluded to a conception of human rights that classifies them in terms of the interests they seek to protect by grandly suggesting that the three generations of human rights correspond, respectively, to the three ideals of the French revolution:
liberty, equality and fraternity. 30 In his view, liberty corresponds to first-generation rights because they protect fundamental freedoms such as freedom of expression and religion. Another way of understanding generations in analytical terms is to treat them as highlighting a conceptual sequencing of types of human rights. Civil and political rights can be thought of as conceptually prior to, and therefore belonging to a generation 'older than', social and economic rights. This is because civil and political rights establish the legal and political standing of those entitled to exercise and enjoy social and economic rights. And the protection of both sets of rights is necessary to the effective enjoyment of a third generation of human rights, such as the right of self-determination. If one is not vested with civil, political, social and economic rights, then one cannot be said to be capable of freely determining one's political status and freely pursuing one's economic, social and cultural development.
With generations as proxies for conceptual sequences, however, it is not clear in manifest a weaker connection. 51 The right to access to health care is closely connected to the right to security of the person, for example, whereas the right to education is loosely connected to the right to a fair trial. 52 The complexity of relations among rights that protect different sets of interests makes generational conceptions of human rights illsuited to the task of classification. Moreover, it risks glossing over commonalities that, as the remainder of this chapter seeks to explain, all human rights in international law share.
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AS MONITORS OF SOVEREIGNTY'S EXERCISE
Different human rights seek to protect different kinds of interests, and the nature of these interests will generate different means of protection. Whether chronological or analytical, a generational conception that stylises these differences misses the fact that, despite the diverse sets of interests they seek to protect, human rights in international law share a common purpose, which is to mitigate injustices produced by the ways in which international law brings legal order to global politics. This account finds its clearest expression in the role that civil and political rights play in international law. Civil and political rights in international law do not align neatly with the class of rights identified as civil by Marshall. For Marshall, they included the right to own property and to enter into contracts, the right to sue and be sued, and rights associated with access to the judiciary. Civil and political rights in international law are generally thought to include rights that protect life, liberty and security of the person, that prohibit various forms of inequalities, including discrimination on grounds such as race, gender, national origin, 51 See Nickel (2008) (distinguishing between weak and strong 'supporting relations' among human rights). 52 The latter example is Nickel's. Nickel (2008) 998.
colour, sexual orientation, ethnicity, religion, and disability, and that protect privacy, freedom of thought and conscience, speech and expression, religion, the press, assembly and movement. They also include rights that relate more to the legal and political standing of individuals, such as those rights that secure procedural fairness in legal proceedings, including the right to a fair trial, due process rights, the right to seek redress or a legal remedy, as well as rights of participation in civil society and politics such as freedom of association, the right to assemble, the right to petition, and the right to vote and run for political office.
The role that civil and political rights play in international law is to mitigate the harm that states can cause to rights-bearers in the exercise of sovereign power that international This is not to say that the content of civil and political rights is completely divorced from moral considerations. The terms of human rights instruments often rely on concepts and principles charged with normative significance (dignity, for example) in their specification of the rights and obligations that they enshrine. The international legal validity of these rights and obligations is not in doubt. Their legal effect, however, rests on how we understand their nature and scope, which invariably requires interpreting the moral concepts and principles to which they refer, and which in turn leads those responsible for their interpretation to venture-explicitly or implicitly-into the realm of moral theory. Article 10(1) cannot be determined solely by reference to the form and manner in which it holds itself out to be a legal rule. They turn, in part at least, on the meaning of the values that Article 10(1) enshrines, which makes separating questions of law from questions of morality a delicate task.
One of the effects of Article 10 may well be to protect universal features of what it means to be human, depending on one's understanding of liberty and dignity. Article 10's presence on the international legal register may also represent a major moral victory, depending on one's morality. It certainly was a significant political victory for those responsible for its international legal existence, because they succeeded in codifying its constituent norms in the form of an international human right. But its legal role-the reason it is a human right in international law-isn't to protect universal features of our common humanity. Nor is it reducible to the intent of those responsible for its international legal existence. Its legal role is to render illegal actions otherwise authorised by international law that have the potential to harm interests that underlie it. As is the case with all civil and political rights-indeed, all human rights-in international law, Article 10 is not so much a legal expression of the demands of abstract morality or the politics of its production as it is an instrument that aims to do justice in the actual international legal order in which we live.
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS AS MONITORS OF SOVEREIGNTY'S EXERCISE
With the adoption of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 1976, the pantheon of international human rights law opened its august doors to a broad set of social and economic rights that guarantee individuals access to a set of basic social resources-such as food, housing, an adequate standard of living, and health care-binding on states party to the Covenant's terms. 64 It conceives of these rights as imposing obligations on states to take measures to secure their protection. 65 Many states appeared quickly to follow suit. The constitutions of states drafted or amended after 1976 overwhelmingly contain at least some of the set of social rights enshrined in the International Covenant. Social rights are now so ubiquitous that they are a defining feature of the contemporary constitutional order. 66 It is tempting to understand the relationship between these international and comparative developments in causal terms. But if part of the project of constitutional design is to protect a political community from its worst fears, 67 and economic rights in domestic constitutions are 'special rights' that 'arise out of special transactions between individuals or out of some special relationship in which they stand to each other'. 70 In contrast, the dominant account of human rights in international law is a moral one, where the legitimacy of a human right rests on its capacity to protect an essential and universal feature of our common humanity. compromised by the fact that some protect only some individuals and not others, and make more sense in some national economies than others. Social and economic rights give rise to duties not easily assimilated by universal accounts, in that they often require states to legislate for their protection and don't rest on a pre-institutional conception of what it means to be human. To the extent that they are comprehended in universal terms, the positive obligations to which they give rise, typically end at state boundaries whereas moral accounts tend to assume that obligations that attach to human rights are universal marginal role for social and economic rights as instruments that aim to secure access to basic goods. Current practice in these and related institutions manifests what Rittich refers to as 'a new regulatory consensus' in international economic circles on the need to 'increase the extent to which economic and social status tracks market measures, market incentives and market success'. 75 To the extent that this consensus contemplates a role for social and economic rights, it is one that merely secures access to social resources for only the least well-off in society and on a temporary basis. Externally, international social and economic rights monitor the establishment and operation of international institutions, such as the World Trade Organisation and the World Bank, and international instruments, such as multilateral and bilateral trade and investment agreements, which determine the international legality of domestic and transnational economic activities. In these contexts, social and economic rights attend to the specific risks produced by processes of economic globalisation and which threaten access to goods that satisfy a person's basic needs, such as food and shelter. Understood in external terms, international social and economic rights are instruments for monitoring these risks. The external obligations to which they give rise, oblige states, acting on the international stage, to minimise the chances of these risks becoming realities. They call on states as international actors to design international legal arrangements in ways that promote interests associated with the social and economic rights of all.
SOVEREIGNTY AND ITS DISTRIBUTION
According to Beitz, the purpose of 'modern human rights doctrine' is to 'address pathologies of a global political structure that concentrates power at dispersed locations not subject to higher-level control'. 78 Beitz's insight captures the first contribution made by the concept of sovereignty to the structure of international law that this essay is seeking to highlight. The concentration of power to which Beitz is referring is sovereignty, and the fact that sovereignty is 'not subject to higher-level control' creates a risk that sovereigns will exercise their power in ways that adversely affect individuals and groups subject to their jurisdiction. Human rights operate to address the pathologies that would flow if sovereigns were relatively free to exercise their sovereign power in represents the whole of its population within its territory, consistent with principles of equality, nondiscrimination, and self-determination, is entitled to maintain its territorial integrity under international law and to have its territorial integrity respected by other states. 79 But international legal rules also determine which collectivities are entitled to 79 See, e.g., UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, GA Res. 50/6, 24 October 1995 (the right of self-determination 'shall not be construed as authorising or encouraging any action that would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and thus possessed of a Government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind'). exercise sovereign authority and over which territory and people such authority operates.
The field entitles a collectivity to form a state and wield sovereign power if it constitutes a 'people' and has experienced severe and ongoing injustices such as colonial rule or alien subjugation, domination or exploitation. 80 Finally, international law also confers legal validity on a claim to sovereignty by a collectivity if it manifests certain properties that international law stipulates as conditions of acquiring statehood. This has the effect of legally including certain political communities, and legally 80 According to some formulations, international law also entitles a people to form a state and assume sovereign power if it is denied any meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination within the state of which it forms a part. The dynamism that new political developments, deemed to possess international legal significance, impart to the distribution of sovereignty is the backdrop to the role that minority rights play in international law. This is partly a function of the fact that international treaties episodically modify the distribution of sovereign power by transferring sovereignty over territory and people from one sovereign actor to another. In so doing, they create majorities and minorities. Minorities exist in relation to majorities, and majorities exist because international law distributes sovereign power over territory and people to certain collectivities and not to others. Not only does it legalise an international distribution of sovereign power, it validates countless ways in which sovereignty can be and is exercised. It confers on states broad powers to exercise sovereign power in ways that can both benefit and harm their populations. By geographically dividing the globe into a finite set of sovereign states, and legally recognising sovereignty as including exclusive rights to a state's territory and 44 resources, international law also determines what belongs to whom, and thus validates a global distribution of wealth and resources. And by empowering sovereign states to establish international instruments and institutions that legalise certain economic and social relations at the expense of others, it provides international legal validity to myriad processes of economic and social globalisation that dramatically affect the nature and levels of poverty and inequality throughout the world. It is to these consequences that human rights in international law-regardless of any chronological or analytical differences they might otherwise possess-seek to attend.
